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Monthly US data on payroll employment, civilian employment, industrial 
production and the unemployment rate are used to define a simple recession-
dating algorithm that nearly perfectly reproduces the NBER official peak and 
trough dates.  The only substantial point of disagreement is with respect to the 
NBER November 1973 peak.  The algorithm prefers September 1974.  In 
addition, this algorithm indicates that the data through June 2008 do not yet 
exceed the recession thresholds, and will do so only if things get much worse.  
 
 
I offer here an algorithm that perfectly identifies the ten official NBER recessions since 
WWII and that closely reproduces the official NBER monthly peak and trough dates.    In 
a similar fashion, Harding and Pagan(2002) produce quarterly peak and trough dates 
based on local extremes of quarterly US GDP, and Harding and Pagan(2006b) produce 
monthly peak and trough dates based on the synchronization of local extremes of four 
monthly times series: industrial production, employment, sales and personal income.  The 
algorithm discussed here is a bit different.  It imposes a minimal threshold decline in 
employment and industrial production to qualify for the recession label, and it defines the 
peaks and troughs in terms of changes in the local trends of the series after the fashion of 
Gelfand et. al.(1976). 
 
The point of an algorithm is to take the guesswork out of the recession definition.   For 
those who are too busy to read more than one paragraph, here is the punch line:  We are 
not yet in a recession.  For those who insist otherwise, I offer a challenge:  What’s your 
algorithm?  
 
One reason we need a clear definition is that the media focus intensely on two questions:  
Is it a bear market?  Are we in recession?   If the answer is “yes, we are in recession,” it 
seems useful to me if both speaker and listener understand what is being said.   The focus 
on recession is not nearly as silly as the focus on bear markets.   It is only somewhat 
misleading to describe the economy as having two states:  healthy and ill.   With that as 
                                                 
1 I am indebted to Jerry Nickelsburg for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft, and to many 
conversations regarding forecasting with Vladimir Keilis-Borok.      2
the framework, the only things a forecaster/analyst brings to the table are 
prognostications regarding the transitions between these two states.  Indeed, the standard 
way to disparage a forecaster is to point out that he or she has predicted 18 of the last 10 
recessions.   But actually, the opposite is the case.  Few econometric models and few 
backs-of-envelopes have the kind of nonlinearities that produce recession forecasts as 
central tendencies, and the forecast record has been more like the prediction of 1 of the 
last 10 recessions.  The episode that we are currently experiencing has been marked by an 
unusually large number of very vocal recession pronouncements.  That, by itself, 
provides statistical evidence that we are not in a recession.  
 
Given the importance of having some clear definition of a recession, it is more than a 
little aggravating that the official recessions are decided by a committee of Ph.D. 
economists.   We can just imagine the committee meeting at which the members pour 
over data displays to try to decide if there was a recession, and, if so, when it began and 
when it ended.  This brings up fantasies of Justice Potter Stewart
2 and other members of 
the Supreme Court perusing pictures of naked men and women to decide which pictures 
are pornographic and which are not.   
 
An alternative to a committee would be a computer algorithm that mimics the 
committee’s decisions but without the whim.  That is difficult for pornography since 
dividing digitized images into pornographic or not is a task that you and I can do pretty 
well, but this kind of pattern recognition is still far in the future for computers.  The point 
of the Potter Stewart statement, “We know it when we see it” is that the definition of 
pornography cannot be codified, and therefore is not programmable.  Further 
complicating the task is the fact that pornography standards are explicitly changing as 
time progresses.   For the NBER and recessions, the data are digital, and quite limited, 
and the standards are fixed, or should be.  So why don’t we have an algorithm?  Since we 
don’t have one, maybe we need to insist that the NBER committee members never 
change; then at least there is some hope that what was a recession in 1958 is still a 
recession in 2008, and conversely.  
 
Without a definition, we have to put up with Potter Stewartisms from Warren Buffett: 
 
"By any common sense definition, we are in a recession," Buffett said. "Business 
is slowing down. We have retail stores in candy, home furnishings and jewelry; 
across the board, I'm seeing a significant slowdown." 
 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/gc06/idUKWEN425620080303, May 3, 2008 
 
Another of my favorites is “It may not be a recession, but it sure feels like one.”   I am 
resisting the temptation to write a delicious, salacious, analogous statement for 
pornography. 
 
                                                 
2 Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964).   3
Two Consecutive Quarters of Negative GDP Growth 
In great contrast, the unofficial widely-accepted definition is two consecutive quarters of 
receding real GDP (negative growth).   This definition has the great advantage that you 
can make a book on it, as is done by the prediction market website Intrade.com.  When 
the first quarter GDP came in positive at the end of April, the Intrade probability of 
recession in 2008 (two negatives in the five quarters commencing 2007Q4) that is 
illustrated in Figure 1 collapsed from over 70% to 30% and as the second quarter looks 
more like a positive than a negative, the probability has fallen to below 20%.  A little 
math helps interpret these numbers.  If the growth rate has a mean of zero, is 
symmetrically distributed, and has no serial correlation (well approximating the 2008 
circumstances), then we are just flipping a coin to get a negative, and the probability of 
two consecutive negatives in the last three quarters of 2008 would be 37.5%, a bit higher 
than the Intrade probability in June and July.   The probability of two consecutive 
negatives in the last two quarters, under the same circumstances is 25%, a bit higher than 
the Intrade estimate of 18% on July 23
rd.  Thus it seems that the market has a mean 
growth a bit greater than zero.  Meanwhile, there were many economists who persist on 
explaining with the utmost confidence that we are in the worst downturn since the Great 
Depression.    
 
Figure 1    Intrade Probability of Recession in 2008 
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Though two quarters of negative GDP growth has the appeal of clarity, it misses the 2001 
downturn, which features three nonconsecutive negative quarters of GDP growth, two of 
which preceded the official recession, though when the negatives occurred depends on 
what GDP release date is relied upon.  Quarterly GDP reports come three times: advance, 
preliminary, and final, and then are subject to further changes at the annual benchmark 
revisions each July. 
3    
 
According to the Intrade contract rule, the “final” data are the ones relied on.  Figure 2 
has the growth rates estimated at three different release dates  
 
(1) The October 31, 2001 data that were available when the NBER announced on 
November 26, 2001 that the official cycle peak was March 2001.   
(2) The June 26, 2003 data that were available when the NBER announced on July 
17, 2003 that the official date of the trough was November 2001. 
(3) The most recent release dated June 2008. 
 
The 2001 recession is most evident in the middle display based on June 2003 data.  Here 
we have negative growth numbers in three consecutive quarters.  But the latest data do 
not have two consecutive negatives, and leave one completely confused by both the 
NBER choice of peak in 2001Q1, which was a negative quarter, and also by the choice of 
trough in 2001 Q4, which was a positive quarter.  Just to make the confusion complete, 
Figure 3 displays the GDP levels, which do not show much “receding” at all, just a patch 
of stumbling forward, not falling down.   The really unsettling feature of this picture is 
that the NBER peak has a GDP less than both adjacent quarters, and the NBER trough 
has a GDP higher than any other point in the recession, and higher even than the peak 
value!! 
                                                 
3 From http://www.bea.gov/national/pdf/NIPAhandbookch1-4.pdf, page 10: 
 
For GDP and most other NIPA series, the set of three current quarterly estimates are released on the 
following schedule. “Advance” estimates are released near the end of the first month after the end of the 
quarter. Most of these estimates are based on initial data from monthly surveys; where source data are not 
yet available, the estimates are generally based on previous trends and judgment. “Preliminary” and “final” 
quarterly estimates are released near the end of the second and third months, respectively; these estimates 
incorporate new and revised data from the monthly surveys and other monthly and quarterly source data 
that have subsequently become available. The current quarterly estimates provide the first look at the path 
of U.S. economic activity. 
Annual revisions of the NIPAs are usually carried out each summer and cover the 3 previous calendar 
years. These estimates incorporate source data that are based on more extensive annual surveys, on annual 
data from other sources, and on later revisions to the monthly and quarterly source data. These revised 
NIPA estimates improve the quality of the picture of U.S. economic activity, though the overall picture is 
generally similar to that shown by the current quarterly estimates. 
Comprehensive revisions are carried out at about 5-year intervals and may result in revisions that extend 
back for many years. These estimates incorporate all of the best available source data, such as data from the 
quinquennial U.S. Economic Census. Comprehensive revisions also provide the opportunity to make 
definitional, statistical, and presentational changes that improve and modernize the accounts to keep pace 
with the ever-changing U.S. economy. Thus, these NIPA estimates represent the most accurate and relevant 
picture of U.S. economic activity. 
1-7   5
 
Figure 2    Growth Estimates at Different Release Dates 
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Figure 3    GDP levels in 2000-2003 per data in June 2008 















The NBER Definition 
Actually, the wise economists at the NBER report that they do not rely much on the GDP 
data because the data are quarterly, not monthly, and subject to substantial revision, as we 
have just seen.  Here is what the NBER committee have said about the recession 
definitions in their report dated November 26, 2001 (italics added). 
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html 
Business Cycle Dating Committee, National Bureau of Economic Research  
Robert Hall, Chair  
Martin Feldstein, President, NBER  
Ben Bernanke  
Jeffrey Frankel  
Robert Gordon  
Victor Zarnowitz 
A recession is a significant decline in activity spread across the economy, lasting 
more than a few months, visible in industrial production, employment, real 
income, and wholesale-retail trade.  
Because a recession influences the economy broadly and is not confined to one 
sector, the committee emphasizes economy-wide measures of economic activity. 
The traditional role of the committee is to maintain a monthly chronology, so the 
committee refers almost exclusively to monthly indicators. The committee gives   7
relatively little weight to real GDP because it is only measured quarterly and it is 
subject to continuing, large revisions. 
The broadest monthly indicator is employment in the entire economy. The 
committee generally also studies another monthly indicator of economy-wide 
activity, personal income less transfer payments, in real terms, adjusted for price 
changes. In addition, the committee refers to two indicators with coverage of 
manufacturing and goods: (1) the volume of sales of the manufacturing and trade 
sectors stated in real terms, adjusted for price changes, and (2) industrial 
production. The Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Commerce Department 
compiles the first and the Federal Reserve Board the second. Because 
manufacturing is a relatively small part of the economy, the movements of these 
indicators often differ from those reflecting other sectors. 
Although the four indicators described above are the most important measures 
considered by the NBER in developing its business cycle chronology, there is no 
fixed rule about which other measures contribute information to the process. 
A recession involves a substantial decline in output and employment. In the past 6 
recessions, industrial production fell by an average of 4.6 percent and 
employment by 1.1 percent. The Bureau waits until the data show whether or not 
a decline is large enough to qualify as a recession before declaring that a turning 
point in the economy is a true peak marking the onset of a recession. 
This statement begins with a vague Potter Stewart definition of recession but edges 
toward an algorithm by identifying four specific monthly series, and even suggesting 
limits like a 1.1 per cent decline in employment.  But in the midst of that hopeful 
development, the committee slaps us back to reality by advising that “there is no fixed 
rule.”    
Well, what they say and what they do may not be the same.  The NBER committee may 
be using a fixed rule, but may not be aware of it.  That would be a natural consequence of 
a committee decision – there can be a predictable collective intelligence, even though 
none of the individuals is aware of it.   If there is a fixed rule, a statistician ought to be 
able to uncover it.  If the rule isn’t fixed, a statistician may be able to uncover that too 
and even predict it, provided that the changes are small enough and smooth enough to 
allow the effective sample size per rule to be greater than one.  So let’s see if we can 
make some progress on this question.   What is the rule that the NBER relies on?   8
Business Cycle Dates Based on Payroll Employment, 
Industrial Production and the Unemployment Rate 
In seeking to automate the definition of recession, we need to find variables that allow us 
to mimic the NBER choices.   Most monthly time series are too noisy to serve this 
function, but three do the job rather well:  the level of payroll employment, the level of 
industrial production and the rate of unemployment.   The NBER dates conform closely 
to periods of falling payroll employment, falling industrial production and rising 
unemployment.  It will prove easy to mimic quite accurately the NBER recession periods 
based on these three series. 
 
The NBER suggests using four series to define recessions: (1) “employment,” (2) 
industrial production, (3) real personal income less transfer payments, and (4) the 
“volume” of sales of the manufacturing and trade sectors.  In using the word 
“employment” the NBER does not distinguish between the household survey and the 
payroll survey.  I will use both.   I will also use industrial production, but not the other 
two series suggested by the NBER.  These two are too hard for me to find to suggest 
using them in a publically available recession-dating algorithm. If you dig deep enough 
into the BEA website, you can find sales of manufacturing and trade on a monthly basis, 
but I couldn’t find a deflator for that series.  Real disposable (net of taxes) personal 
income is reported on the FRED website, but not transfer payments.  Furthermore, the 
year-over-year growth of real disposable personal income illustrated below is a wildly 
up-down series that misses many recessions and finds many that are not there.   
 
Figure 4    Year over Year Growth in Real Disposable Personal Income 
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Figure 5 depicts industrial production and nonfarm payrolls from January 1947 to June 
2008 with the official NBER recessions shaded, peak+1 to trough.
4  Clearly, declines in 
industrial production and payroll jobs are features of our official recessions.  Figure 6 
depicts the data collected from the Household Survey: Employment and Labor Force and 
also the implied unemployment rate: 100*(1 – (Employment/Labor Force)).  A reason to 
be sensitive to the difference in the employment and labor force data is that the most 
recent rise in the unemployment rate is a consequence of stable employment with rising 
labor force, depicted in Figure 7.  One might imagine that in a recession, labor force 
growth is weak or negative while employment is substantially falling.  If that were the 
case, the recent rise in the unemployment rate would not be indicative of recessions.  To 
explore this possibility, Figure 8 depicts the employment and labor force data for all ten 
recessions plus the 2008 data.  As it turns out, 2008 does not seem all that unusual, so 
perhaps this concern is unfounded.  I will explore this more below by using both the 
unemployment rate and the household employment level as alternative variables to form 
a recession-dating algorithm.  As it turns out, the employment level is quite inferior to the 
unemployment rate.   To make the point pointedly: don’t quickly dismiss the importance 
of the recent rise in the unemployment rate because so much of it comes from strong 
labor force participation. 
 
                                                 
4 These recession shadings often go from peak to trough, but the peak month is part of the expansion not 
part of the recession.   The usual shading incorrectly suggests that the unshaded expansions go from 
trough+1 to peak-1.  Regardless of what choice is made, it is important to know which was chosen.  
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Recession Dating Algorithms 
 
Cycle peak and trough dates have been suggested in the literature on stochastic regime-
switching that has emanated from Hamilton(1989).  Papers include Chauvet and 
Hamilton (2005 ), Durland and McCurdy (1994),  and Layton(1996).  This econometric 
analysis is part of a search for a model that best approximates how the economy operates.  
My goal here is not to approximate the economy but rather to mimic the NBER 
committee, in process as well as outcome, a process that presumably follows the lead of 
Burns and Mitchell(1946).   In that attempt, I will use a non-probabilistic data-analytic 
approach rather than an econometric probabilistic approach, as has been done by Harding 
and Pagan(2002) which compares econometric and data analytic approaches and Harding 
and Pagan(2006a, 2006b) which offer non-probabilistic algorithms.  
 
We begin here with an examination of data series in comparison with thresholds.   This is 
clearly how the NBER process begins, since a meeting of the NBER committee is 
triggered by data exceeding some thresholds, like a decline in GDP or jobs.  After it has 
been determined that a recession has occurred because the data exceed certain thresholds, 
the next step is to select the peak and trough months.  This, I imagine, is done by the 
NBER using “eyeball” estimation.  To find the peaks and troughs, the eyeball would 
likely be drawn to local minima and maxima.   Rather than local maxima and minima as 
used by Burns and Mitchell(1946) and Harding and Pagan(2006 and b), I will search for 
changes in the local trends of the data, thus ignoring local maxima and minima that are 
similar to the surrounding data (e.g. very gradual increases in unemployment above some 
local long-standing minimum don’t count) and also allowing for the possibility that for 
some data the recession dates reflect substantial changes in the growth rates, not 





The first step in the recession-dating algorithm is to select periods that satisfy recession 
thresholds.  Figure 9 to Figure 12 illustrate the 6-month growth of jobs and industrial 
production and the 6-month increase in the unemployment rate confined to periods of 
falling jobs and industrial production and rising unemployment.  Each of these graphs has 
a line representing a recession threshold that is selected to discriminate best between 
recessions and non-recessions, by picking months in all ten recessions but no month 
outside these recessions.  
 
The payroll jobs threshold log(payroll/payroll(-6))<-0.005 perfectly identifies all ten 
recessions and only these recessions.  If the threshold is lowered enough to include the 
                                                 
5 Birchenhall et.al.(1999) use a logistic regression to “predict” the NBER recession 
periods.  This also approximates the NBER choices in outcome, but not in process.  
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most recent data, then the 2001 recession has a second dip and another recession pops out 
in the 1950s. 
 
The industrial production threshold log(ip/ip(-6))< -0.03 picks up the ten official 
recessions plus three more in the 1950s.  If the threshold is increased to get rid of these 
extra downturns, then we lose the 2001 and 1970 recessions.  If the threshold is lowered 
to the point where the most recent data are included, several other suggested recessions 
emerge.   
 
The u-u(-6) > 0.8  threshold for the rise in unemployment is just high enough to allow it 
to perfectly identify all ten recessions and just low enough to capture the most recent 
data.  A somewhat lower threshold would find another recession in 1959. 
 
Though the unemployment data seem to identify recessions accurately, the 
unemployment rate is a function of both civilian employment and also civilian labor force 
participation. Employment is a measurement of a physical reality – getting up in the 
morning and going to work.  But unemployment is partly psychological, and can vary 
downward because job-seekers get discouraged or upward because of favorable 
expectations about finding a good job.  The movement in the unemployment rate that is 
due to rapid changes in labor force participation may or may not be relevant for defining 
recessions.  An alternative to using the unemployment rate to define recessions is to use 
civilian employment.    
 
The six-month declines in civilian employment are illustrated in Figure 12. The civilian 
employment threshold log(emp/emp(-6))< -0.004 identifies all the official recessions and 
also picks November 2007 as a cycle peak. This cutoff also selects two additional 
recessions in 1951 and 1952, and turns the 1981 recession into a double dip.    A more 
extreme cutoff of -0.005 would get rid of many of these, but would also get rid of the 
official 1970 recession.   
 
If the diagrams are not so clear, the results are summarized numerically in Table 1 which 
indicates various thresholds and the corresponding number of extra recessions beyond the 
NBER 10.  The minimal threshold is the level needed to pick up all ten of the NBER 
recessions.  The other thresholds are all lower and thus select these ten recessions, and 
sometimes more.  For industrial production, the minimal threshold of -.032 selects 3 
additional straggling recessions, as does the somewhat lower threshold that I am using: -
0.030.  If the threshold were lowered so that the 2008 data satisfied it, we would identify 
an additional 10 unwanted recessions. The unemployment rate does much better, and 
does not identify additional recessions with my threshold +0.8 or with the 2008 value.  
Payroll employment is good at identify just the 10 recessions, though with my threshold 
we get one straggler month, and with the 2008 limit we get 3 additional unwanted 
recessions.  Finally, the performance of civilian employment is substandard, since even 
for the minimal threshold needed to select the 10 NBER recessions, it finds 9 additional 
sequences of months that satisfy the threshold.   15
 
Table 1   Recession Thresholds and Extra Recessions 
 
6 Month Growth of Industrial Production    
 Minimal  Leamer  Other  2008   
Threshold -0.032  -0.030  -0.020  -0.010   
Extra Recessions  3  3  4  10   
          
6 Month Growth of Payroll Employment   
 Minimal  Leamer  Other  2008   
Threshold -0.0087  -0.0050  -0.0040  -0.0032   
Extra Recessions  0  1  1  3   
          
6 Month Change in Unemployment Rate   
 Minimal  Leamer  Other  2008   
Threshold 1.02  0.80  0.70  0.82   
Extra Recessions  0  0  1  0   
          
6 Month Growth of Civilian Employment   
 Minimal  Leamer  Other  2008   
Threshold -0.005  -0.004  -0.005  -0.004   
Extra Recessions  9  9  7  9   
       
The Minimal Threshold is the Level Just Exceeded by all 10 Recessions 
  An Extra Recession is a Contiguous Sequence of One or More 
Months Satisfying the Threshold   
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Peak and Trough Dates 
Having identified thresholds that can be used to determine the approximate recession 
periods, the next step is to select an algorithm for picking the exact peak and trough 
dates.  To do this, I use the second derivatives of each series, with cycle peaks when a 
second derivative is maximally negative and cycle troughs when the second derivative is 
maximally positive.   With y(t) referring to industrial production or employment, the 
logarithmic 6-month second derivative is  
 
log(y(t+6)/y(t)) -  log(y(t)/y(t-6)) 
 
which is the difference in the growth over the next six months compared with the last six 
months.  Thus in looking for local extremes of this second derivative, we are searching 
for transition points between periods of high and low growth – the kind of nonlinearity 
that a recession is all about.   A recession is beginning when this second derivative is 
negative – in other words when a period of healthy growth is followed by a period of 
weak or negative growth.  A recession is ending when this second derivative is positive, 
in other words when a period of weak or negative growth is followed by a period of 
healthy growth.  This is after the fashion of forecasts produced by V.I. Keilis-Borok and 
coauthors who use changes in local trends to identify events that are accumulated into 
alarms of forthcoming rises in unemployment and recessions. 
6   
 
Figure 13 depicts the second derivative of the log of payroll employment, plotted twice 
depending on whether the following six months or the preceding six months satisfies the 
recession threshold:  
 
Recession ahead:  log(log(y(t+6)/y(t)) < -0.005 
Recession behind: log(log(y(t)/y(t-6)) < -0.005 
 
A cycle peak occurs when the second derivative is maximally negative for the recession 
ahead subperiods and a cycle trough occurs when the second derivative is maximally 
positive for the recession behind periods.  
 
The 6-month second derivatives subject to these forward and backward thresholds for 
industrial production, unemployment and civilian employment are illustrated in Figure 14   
Figure 15 and Figure 16.   The suggested peaks and troughs, which are the local maxima 
and minima of these second derivatives, are reported in Table 2.
7 
 
                                                 
6 Gelfand et.al., (1976) , Keilis-Borok et.al. (1990), V. Keilis-Borok et.al. (2000). 
 
7 Notice, by the way, that a positive second derivative is associated with the cycle peak, because the 
downturn has rising unemployment, while a negative second derivative is associated with a cycle trough.   19
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Table of Results and Recession-Dating Algorithm 
The NBER peak and trough months are compared with the peak and trough months 
suggested by the extreme second derivatives of the payroll data, industrial production, the 
unemployment rate and the civilian employment data in Table 2.   The number of months 
between the data-suggested peaks and troughs and the NBER peaks and troughs are also 
reported. There are a lot of zeroes and ones here, meaning that the NBER and these 
dating methods to a large extent conform.   
 
The employment data provides the largest disagreements with the NBER dates, including 
turning the 1981 recession into a double dip affair, and adding two more recessions in the 
early 1950s.   The unemployment rate does a much better job and apparently my concern 
about the role of the changes in labor force participation in determining the 
unemployment rate doesn’t much matter.  Or maybe to put it differently, it appears as 
though the NBER historically has relied on the unemployment rate, not the level of 
household employment to pick the peak and trough dates.  So let’s just drop the 
employment data and work with payroll jobs, industrial production and the 
unemployment rate.  
 
These three series do not always suggest the same peak and trough dates. To resolve the 
differences use the median date, indicated in the last two columns.  Another way to say 
this is that a cycle peak occurs when two of the three series so indicate and likewise for a 
trough.   With these median dates we replicate the NBER results almost perfectly!  By the 
way, this does a much better job picking identifying the NBER peaks than does the 
Harding and Pagan(2006b) algorithm which averages 2.7 months early in the seven 
recessions from 1960-2001. 
 
So that’s the algorithm: 
 
Recession Dating Algorithm 
 
1.   Pick probable recessions based on the following thresholds:  
 
A decline in industrial production for 6 Months at the rate of -6% per year 
or more. 
A decline in payroll employment for 6 Months at the rate of -1% per year or 
more. 
An increase in the unemployment rate in a 6 month period by at least +0.8 
percentage points. 
 
Every recession since World War II has included months that satisfied all three of these 
limits.   And there has never been a time in the expansions during which all three of these 
limits were satisfied.  (The extra recessions come only from the industrial production 
limits.)   
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2.  From the periods identified in step 1 for each of the three variables 
separately identify suggested peak and trough dates as the months when 6-
month second derivatives are maximally negative (peak) and maximally 
positive (troughs). 
 
The second derivative of the series y is defined as (y(t+6)-y(t))- (y(t)-y(t-6)) 
with logarithmic transformation for series with demonstrable time trends 
(industrial production and employment.) 
 
3.  Reconcile differences in the peak and trough dates by using the median of the 
three dates.  
   23
 
Table 2   Peaks and Troughs Per Payroll Data 
 
Business Cycle Peaks and Troughs per NBER and Three Monthly Indicators     
Plus Median Month of Payroll, Industrial Production and Unemployment       
Dif = Difference in Months from  NBER  dates            
                    
                    
   NBER Payroll  Dif IP  Dif U  Dif Emp  Dif  Median Dif 
1  Peak  Nov-48 Oct-48 -1 Oct-48 -1 Nov-48 0 Jul-48 -4 Oct-48 -1
 Trough  Oct-49  Feb-50  4 Oct-49 0 Oct-49 0 Jun-49  -4  Oct-49 0
2 Peak  Jul-53  Jul-53  0 Jul-53 0 Jul-53 0 Feb-53 -5  Jul-53 0
  Trough  May-54  Aug-54 3 Jan-54 -4 May-54 0 Aug-54 3  May-54 0
3 Peak  Aug-57 Aug-57  0 Aug-57 0 Oct-57 2 Jul-57  -1  Aug-57 0
  Trough Apr-58  May-58 1 Apr-58 0 Apr-58 0 Apr-58 0  Apr-58 0
4  Peak  Apr-60  Apr-60 0 Feb-60 -2 May-60 1 Sep-60 5  Apr-60 0
  Trough Feb-61  Feb-61 0 Feb-61 0 May-61 3 May-61 3  Feb-61 0
5  Peak  Dec-69  Apr-70 4 Aug-69 -4 Dec-69 0 Dec-69 0  Dec-69 0
 Trough  Nov-70  Nov-70  0 Nov-70 0 Dec-70 1 Jun-70  -5  Nov-70 0
6 Peak  Nov-73  Oct-74 11 Sep-74 10 Aug-74 9 Oct-74 11 Sep-74 10
  Trough Mar-75  Apr-75 1 Mar-75 0 Apr-75 1 Apr-75 1  Apr-75 1
7 Peak  Jan-80  Jan-80  0 Feb-80 1 Dec-79 -1 Dec-79  -1  Jan-80 0
  Trough  Jul-80 Jul-80 0 Jul-80 0 Jun-80 -1 Aug-80 1 Jul-80 0
8 Peak  Jul-81  Jul-81  0 Jul-81 0 Jul-81 0       Jul-81 0
 Trough  Nov-82  Dec-82  1 Dec-82 1 Nov-82 0      Dec-82 1
9  Peak  Jul-90  May-90 -2 Sep-90 2 Jun-90 -1 Mar-90 -4 Jun-90 -1
  Trough Mar-91  May-91 2 Mar-91 0 Mar-91 0 May-91 2  Mar-91 0
10 Peak  Mar-01 Mar-01  0 Dec-00 -3 May-01 2 Feb-01 -1 Mar-01 0
  Trough Nov-01  Feb-02 3 Oct-01 -1 Dec-01 1 Jan-02 2  Dec-01 1
11  Peak           Nov-07   Nov-07      
                    
                    
 Peak        Jan-52      Mar-51      
 Trough        Jul-52      Sep-51      
 Peak        Jan-56      Dec-51      
 Trough        Jul-56      Aug-52      
 Peak        Apr-59      Apr-81      
 Trough        Nov-59      Jan-82      
 Peak              May-82      
 Trough        Jan-82      Feb-83      
                    
                    
Expansion  Peak  Conditions               
 (LOG(PAYROLL(+6)/PAYROLL)<-0.005)            
 (LOG(IP(+6)/IP)<-0.03)               
 (U(+6)-U>0.8)                 
 (LOG(EMP_CIV(+6)/EMP_CIV)<-0.004)           
 




The only question mark about this algorithm is raised by recession 6 which has an NBER 
peak in November 1973 but peaks for the four series reported in Table 2 at 11, 10, 9 and 
11 months later.   What was the NBER thinking, anyway?     
 
Figure 17 and Figure 18 contrast the official NBER recession in 1974 with the recession 
suggested by my recession-dating algorithm. The NBER has begun their 1973/4 recession 
in a period of economic weakness in which industrial production is decaying a bit and the 
unemployment rate is elevating but payroll employment is still rising.  What the NBER 
dates ignore altogether is the late peak of the payroll data and the dramatic change in the 
slope of the industrial production data in the middle of the official recession.  This point, 
where both industrial production and payroll employment begin a precipitous decline, is 
what my algorithm selects.  It may not be so clear, but the unemployment rate also has a 
maximal derivative at about the same point:  the rate was rising slowly until August 1974 
when it really took off. 
 
So which do you like?  I like mine.  Remember that mine is selected to be consistent with 
the choices that the NBER has made in the 60 years covered by this data set.  I 
particularly cannot see the validity of the NBER peak given the payroll data that not only 
has a maximal derivative in October 1974, but has the largest value locally as well.  
That’s a “peak” isn’t it? 
 
This argument in favor of my choices is clouded by the GDP growth data displayed in 
Figure 19.  For those of you who like negative growth numbers, there are plenty here in 
both 1973 and 1974.  If you need consecutive negatives, however, they occur in 1974q3 – 
1975q1, which is pretty close to the quarters selected by my rule.  Looking through the 
right glasses at the level of real GDP depicted in Figure 20 further supports my choice.  
since it appears as though the second derivative thinking would select 1974q2 as the peak 
because 1974q2 is above the levels of both 1973q3 and 1974q1, and because the half-
year decline in real GDP is very great after 1974q2.  But, if you don’t work so hard at it, 
and if you move Figure 20 far from your eyes so you can see only the “big picture”, you 
cannot miss the GDP peak in the 1973Q3 and the trough in 1974q4, which is exactly the 
way the NBER “sees” it.   Moreover, the results of the second derivative algorithm 
reported in Table 3 agree with the NBER, even though I first “saw” it differently.  In 
other words, we have a problem here with GDP. 
 
I am tempted to do what the NBER committee has done and simply discount the GDP 
numbers, but I think I can plant a seed of doubt about the validity of the real GDP 
numbers in 1973 and 1974.  There was a three-fold increase in the price of oil in 1973 
and 1974, illustrated in Figure 21.   I wonder if that caused problems in measuring the 
price level?  The year 1974 was not all that unusual in terms of the growth of nominal 
GDP, illustrated in Figure 22,  but there was a real surge in the measured rate of inflation, 
illustrated in Figure 23.  I wonder if they got that right…..   25
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Table 3   Peaks and Troughs from Real GDP data using 2Q Second Derivatives 
     
 NBER  RGDP  dif 
Peak 1948Q4  1948Q3  -1
Trough 1949Q4  1949Q1  -3
Peak 1953Q2  1953Q2  0
Trough 1954Q2  1954Q2  0
Peak 1957Q3  1957Q3  0
Trough 1958Q2  1958Q2  0
Peak 1960Q2  1960Q1  0
Trough 1961Q1  1961Q1  0
Peak 1969Q4  1969Q3  -1
Trough 1970Q4  1970Q4  0
Peak 1973Q4  1973Q4  0
Trough 1975Q1  1975Q1  0
Peak 1980Q1  1980Q1  0
Trough 1980Q3  1980Q3  0
Peak 1981Q3  1981Q3  0
Trough 1982Q4  1982Q4  0
Peak 1990Q3  1990Q2  -1
Trough 1991Q1  1991Q1  0
Peak 2001Q1  2001Q1  0
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2008 
Figure 24 illustrates the recent data and the proposed recession cut-offs.  The 
unemployment rate satisfies the cutoff in one month, just barely, because of that sharp 
increase in May, but when June held steady the six-month change backed off a bit.  The 
payroll data look like they are going to cross the threshold soon enough, but actually the 
rate of decline of payroll jobs has been very steady over the last six months at the six-
month rate of -.03, well short of the cutoff of -.05.   And the problems in industrial 
production are nowhere close to the limit.  Bottom line:  things have to get much worse to 
pass the recession threshold. 
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OK, I admit it; I have a stake in this.  The UCLA Anderson Forecast has maintained since 
December 2005, that the housing adjustment would be extreme, but, unlike all other such 
housing adjustments in the historical data, this time we would not have a recession 
because the manufacturing employment numbers have been favorably positioned.  With 
my neck sticking so far out, if my algorithm identified a recession using the 2008 data, 
you may suspect that I would suppress it.  You would be wrong, I think, but don’t just 
dismiss my effort for that reason; offer an algorithm of your own.  Let’s have your 
recession definition. 
 
I know that at any moment we could fall into the recession abyss.  I know that the payroll 
and household data might be revised, and leave me with a bright red face.  In the 
meantime, we need to recognize that if this doesn’t qualify as a recession, it surely isn’t 
normal growth.  Since this is something very different from anything in the recorded 
history,  we need a name for what we are experiencing.   That’s obvious.  It’s a severe 
Buffeting.   31
Postscript: Structural Adjustments Ahead 
There is another problem with the 
recession definition – it is binary.  The two 
categories of expansion and contraction do 
not do justice to a variegated reality.  We 
surely need to distinguish between 
temporary “dips” in which the economy 
returns to where it was after a year or two, 
versus structural adjustments in which 
there was no return to those old days 
anytime soon.
8  One structural adjustment 
was the 1953 Korean War Disarmament 
Downturn– shifting from a wartime to a 
peacetime economy. Defense spending 
illustrated in the figure on the right that 
had ramped up to 15% of GDP in 1953 
during the hostilities crashed back to 
11% in 1955, producing an official 
NBER recession that began the very 
month that the armistice was signed 
when defense spending began its 
precipitous decline.  Another structural 
adjustment was the 2001 Internet 
Comeupance.  During the Internet 
Rush, spending on equipment and 
software as a fraction of GDP, 
illustrated on the right, rose to an 
historic high of 9.4% but has since 
retreated to more normal levels a bit 
over 7%.     
 
These structural shifts were 
accompanied by a reduction in jobs and 
industrial production and an increase in 
the unemployment rate, but when the total jobs and industrial production recovered, what 
we produced and who produced it were substantially different.     The weakness in jobs 
and production during a structural adjustment is not a symptom of a diseased economy 
with poorly functioning markets; it is only a symptom of the rapid but efficient transition 
from one mix of output to another.    This is not the kind of problem that should be 
treated with stimulative monetary or fiscal policy, except as these policies keep the 
pathology confined to the sector from which it originates.  
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The problem that really needs the right kind of preventative and curative fiscal and 
monetary policy are the Consumer Durables Cycles (Homes and Appliances and 
Cars), of which we have had eight since World War II.  We have cycles in these items 
because owning a palatial home and a cool car are fundamental to the American pecking 
order, and because during expansions these durables can seem eminently affordable while 
in recessions the acquisition of homes and cars is easily postponable.  When 
circumstances require, we can make do with the homes and cars we already have and 
reduce maintenance spending too, even it means crowding into ramshackle homes and 
driving old heaps.  We can also do without those expensive cups of coffee from 
Starbucks and if things get really bad we can postpone the purchase of those Louis Vuitton 
designer purses that retail for $2,000.  That’s a consumer downturn.
9   The right medicine 
for this bipolar consumer disease is high interest rates and tax rates during expansions to 
make the durables less affordable and low interest rates and tax rates during recessions to 
make them more affordable.  
 
We may be on the cusp of a consumer durables downturn but there is a very real 
possibility that we are in the early stages of a major structural adjustment.  Figure 25 
illustrates the component shares of GDP:  consumption plus investment plus government 
plus net exports.   The scales are chosen so that all vary by 12 percentage points, making 
the pictures directly comparable. This is where you can see the structural adjustments that 
have occurred and the structural adjustments that lie ahead. 
 
Notice that the investment share of GDP has plenty of ups and downs but no discernable 
trends.  The low real rates of interest that we have been experiencing, the innovations in 
the financial markets and the tax cuts have not had a discernible affect on the investment 
share of GDP.  That’s disappointing. But it is hard even to look at the investment figure 
while the consumption picture to the left is shouting out: look at me!   The consumption 
share of GDP began a steady march upward from 62% of GDP in 1980 to 70% today.   
We are not an ownership society, we are a consumption society.  That rise by 8 
percentage points in the consumption share of GDP had to be offset by a fall in some 
other shares.   About 2 percentage points come from a decline in government spending as 
a share of GDP.  That seems like a good thing, though the potholes in the road are 
starting to bother me.  The other 6 percentage point reduction came from the trade 
imbalance: exports minus imports.   So that’s the story.  The low rates of interest, the 
innovations in the financial markets and the tax cuts have turned us into a consumption-
loving debt-ridden foreign-depending society.    
 
The slaps in the face each time we fill up our SUVs are carrying the rude message: things 
have to change. You cannot maintain that profligate life style.  The structural adjustment 
that lies ahead seem certain to come with unbalanced sluggish growth and weak labor 
markets for a considerable period of time.  Misery, but no recession. 
                                                 
9 A consumer cycle is driven by a Minsky cycle in lending standards that makes the financing for homes 
and cars cheap and available to anyone who can fog a mirror when home prices  are appreciating because 
the loans are self-collateralizing.  Inevitably, price appreciation slows and lending standards rise 
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